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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2208 
___________ 
 
ARNOLD D. SCHRAGER, 
a/k/a Arnold Schrager 
 
v. 
 
JENNIFER ALDANA 
 
 
Arnold D. Schrager,  
Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-04758) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 22, 2013 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 19, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Arnold Schrager alleges that Appellee Jennifer Aldana conspired with 
Karen Lipton and Russell Rosenblatt to defraud the estate of Roslyn Schrager, the mother 
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of Appellant and Lipton, for over $1 million.  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss.  The main issue on appeal is 
whether Schrager, as a beneficiary of the Estate, has standing to sue under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
Schrager is one of the beneficiaries of the estate (hereinafter Estate) of Roslyn 
Schrager, his mother, who died in August 2007.  From October 2007 to November 2007, 
Karen Lipton (hereinafter Lipton), mother of Appellee and sister of Schrager, converted 
$1,130,516 from the Estate into cash and, together with Russell Rosenblatt, laundered the 
money through various bank accounts and real estate investments, including a home in 
Nevada.  Lipton and Rosenblatt also gave large sums of money to Appellee, who was 
attempting to get financing for a new home in New Jersey.  Some time thereafter the 
Clark County Public Administrator, located in Nevada, assumed administration over the 
Estate.   Two legal actions were taken against Lipton and Rosenblatt which resulted in 
judgments against them; the Clark County Court of Nevada entered a civil judgment for 
Schrager and his co-beneficiary to the amount of $259,647,
1
 and the Clark County 
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 Schrager v. Lipton, Clark County Civil Court, Case #07A551013 
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Probate Court found for the Estate in the amount of $3,427,692.
2
  Lipton and Rosenblatt 
allegedly fled the country and are not included as defendants here. 
Schrager, a resident of California, filed the instant action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging private causes of action for money 
laundering, bank fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud, as well as a civil RICO claim based on 
the foregoing predicate acts against Appellee, a resident of New Jersey.  Schrager also 
filed a RICO case statement alleging the additional predicate acts of embezzlement and 
bankruptcy fraud.  Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
because Schrager was not a proper party in interest, or, alternatively for a change of 
venue, which the Court granted on jurisdictional grounds on July 26, 2012.  The case was 
transferred to the District of New Jersey. 
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, which the District Court granted on March 29, 2013.  The District 
Court held there is no private right of action with regards to money laundering, bank, 
mail or wire fraud and that Schrager lacked standing in regard to the civil RICO claim.  
The District Court addressed the three factors for determining proximate cause 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 
503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992), and concluded that Schrager lacked standing because the 
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 In the Matter of Roslyn Schrager, Clark County Family Court, Case #07P061169 
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Estate was the immediate victim better suited to sue for the alleged injury.  Schrager filed 
a timely notice of appeal.
3
  
II. 
 Schrager does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that there is no private 
cause of action for money laundering, bank, mail or wire fraud.  He does, however, 
challenge the District Court’s conclusion that he lacks standing for civil RICO purposes.  
We agree with the District Court.  Applying the multi-factor analysis announced in 
Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992), we conclude that 
Schrager has not suffered a direct injury proximately caused by Appellee and therefore 
lacks the standing necessary to litigate a civil RICO claim.  
The RICO Act prohibits certain conduct involving a pattern of racketeering 
activities and allows for a private right of action.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c).  In order to 
have standing to litigate a civil RICO claim under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must make a 
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 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s order 
dismissing the complaint is de novo.  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 
(3d Cir. 2008); Gould Electronics, Inc. v. U.S., 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must present facts that, if 
true, show a facially plausible right to relief.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007); see also Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2012).  We 
“consider the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as 
well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complaints claims are based on these 
documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  “A claim may be 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) only if it clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely 
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”  Gould, 
220 F.3d at 178 (internal quotations omitted). 
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threshold showing that he suffered an injury to business or property and that the injury 
was proximately caused by the defendant’s racketeering activities.  See Holmes v. 
Security Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 
472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000); Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 260 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Here, plaintiff has alleged a financial loss due to the diminution of the estate of which he 
is a beneficiary.  This loss can serve as the basis for standing so long as the additional 
criterion of proximate causation is met. 
“A causal connection simpliciter between the defendants’ actions and the 
plaintiffs’ injuries is insufficient to give rise to a RICO claim; the plaintiff must show that 
that connection is proximate, i.e., not too remote.”  Callahan, 182 F.3d at 260.  To make a 
determination about proximate causation, the Court considers three factors: (1) the 
directness of the injury; (2) the ease of apportioning damages among other plaintiffs 
affected by the alleged violation; and (3) the possibility that others, more directly injured, 
could vindicate the claim. Id., at 263-265 (citing the test set forth in Holmes, 503 U.S. 
258 (1992)). 
Applying the multi-factor analysis test of Holmes to the present case, we conclude 
that Schrager, as a beneficiary of the Estate, cannot maintain his claim based on § 1962.  
Schrager argues that Appellee conspired with her mother Lipton and family-friend 
Rosenblatt to defraud the Estate of Rosyln Schrager, through a pattern of racketeering 
activity, of over $1 million and thereby caused Schrager, a beneficiary of the Estate, to 
suffer a direct monetary injury.  The direct victim of Appellee’s conduct was the Estate, 
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not Schrager.  It was the Estate that lost value due to the fraudulent activities of Appellee 
and her co-conspirators and therefore the Estate is in a better position to bring a civil 
RICO claim.
4
  See Firestone v. Gailbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 285 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that grandchildren, as beneficiaries of decedent’s estate, lacked standing to bring a RICO 
claim because the estate suffered the direct harm).  Consequently, Schrager lacks 
standing to bring an individual RICO claim.
5
 
III.  
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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 In fact, Schrager’s complaint alleges that the Clark County Public Administrator, who is 
in the process of settling the Estate, has already taken action to recover the defrauded 
funds from Lipton, Rosenblatt and Appellee. See Compl., #22, 02/02/2012 (“Clark 
County Probate Court finds for the Estate and against Lipton, Russell Rosenblatt…and 
R& B Tutoring (a shell company owned by Rosenblatt) in the amount of $3,427,692); Id., 
at 31 (Shawn L. Morris, Esq., attorney for the Clark County Public Administrator 
requested the return of the $140,000 Defendant received from Lipton and Rosenblatt). 
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 Because we find Schrager lacks standing to bring a civil RICO claim, we decline to 
address the other issues raised on appeal, neither of which relate to standing.  Our 
decision today does not reflect a lack of appreciation for Mr. Schrager’s efforts to right 
the wrongs done to his mother’s estate, nor do we take lightly the frustration he has faced 
in pursuing relief.  He does not, however, have standing to pursue a RICO claim, and that 
is dispositive in this matter 
